Playing ball with Zeus: strategies in reading ancient slavery through dreams

In dreaming,
The clouds methought would open and show riches
Ready to drop upon me, that, when I waked,
I cried to dream again.
(Caliban in *The Tempest* Act 111 scene 2)

Who is so alienated from human experience that they have not on occasion noticed some truth in a dream? (Tertullian, *de Anima* 46)

It is Sicily in the 130s BCE. The large numbers of newly imported slaves are being badly treated: branded, starved, inadequately clad, and savagely beaten. They discuss rebellion although they do not yet implement it. But a Syrian slave named Eunus encourages them by reporting oracles and messages from the gods about the future that he has received both in dreams and waking visions. Encouraged by Eunus' special foreknowledge, the slaves rise up, kill their masters, found a new kingdom and oppose the might of the Roman army. The source for this remarkable series of events, the Sicilian historian Diodorus, thinks that Eunus invented his dreams in order to exert power over the other slaves (*Library* 34/35.2.4-5). Since Diodorus was writing two centuries after the events in question, we might question the reliability both of his sources and his moralistic judgement of the authenticity of Eunus' dreams. But there are two undeniable truths underlying this narrative: Diodorus assumes that his readership will find it entirely plausible that slaves can dream of self-emancipation, and that slaves can believe in the predictive power of dreams enough to start a mass revolt.

In recent times there has been considerable interest in the psychological damage caused by slavery.[1] Recorded dreams of slaves in Carolina show that they often concerned

the dreamers' ancestors, and it has been suggested that this was a 'coping mechanism' that presented in the form of a psychological residue from ancestor veneration in their indigenous African religions.[2] Some psychoanalysts have argued that the psychological damage inflicted by the removal of kinship ties, identity, and sources of support, as well as by ongoing trauma, can be handed down within families descended from slaves over many generations.[3] Even for the descendants of slaves, 'confrontation of the internalised slaver is just as important as it was to confront the external slaver'.[4] A man originally born a slave, Samuel Ward, wrote as early as 1855 that although he had no conscious memories of slavery, it remained 'among my thoughts, my superstitions, my narrow views, my awkwardness... Ah, the infernal impress is upon me, and I fear I shall transmit it my child, and they to theirs! How deeply seated, how far reaching, a curse it is!'[5] In records of ancient dreams involving slavery we therefore potentially have a source of exceptional value for its psychological effects in that society. If there are any ancient records of specific dreams experienced by individuals enduring servitude, they might offer the type of insight into their subjective psychological lives which the essays in this volume have demonstrated are so hard to identify in other sources. Predictably, few of the dreams recorded in most ancient texts were created in the psyches of slaves, since the dreams of heroes, magistrates, king and generals, as well as their elite womenfolk, were of course far more likely to be recorded, or fictively imagined, by historiographers, poets and playwrights. But the evidence for slave dreamers is augmented substantially by one remarkable ancient source, the five-book *Interpretation of Dreams* (*Oneirocritica*) written in the second century CE during the age of the Antonines by Artemidorus of Daldis in Lydia (Asia Minor), in which the dreaming slave and dreams about slaves are staple features of the discourse.

In this chapter I take it as self-evident that in a field where revealing materials are is so difficult to come by, we can't afford to dispense with any type of source just because it presents hermeneutic challenges. I argue that Artemidorus' dream book does something to which no other pagan source from the ancient Greek and Roman worlds can remotely lay claim: it treats the subjectivity of slaves with *exactly* the same seriousness as the subjectivity

of the free. Some scholars have argued that it was in his desire to cater for the 'sophisticated elite' of the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire that Artemidorus actually differed from other, more socially downmarket oneirocritics.[6] But this is to obscure altogether the startling fact that when Artemidorus discusses the meaning of a dream symbol, he frequently and dispassionately tells the reader precisely what it signifies for a rich man, a poor man, and a slave, or for a free woman and a slave woman respectively.[7] Sometimes he even distinguishes between its meaning for different types of slave: 'White clothes are auspicious for those accustomed to wear them and Greek slaves... In the case of Roman slaves they are good only for those who are well behaved. For other Roman slaves, they mean bad luck' (2.3). Slaves in some fictional, imaginative sources, especially drama, had of course sometimes been allowed a degree of psychological interiority by ancient playwrights, although to a much lesser degree than high status characters. But when it comes to the 'real', everyday slaves of antiquity, Artemidorus' acknowledgement that they had an inner psychological life that is as susceptible to interpretation as anyone else's is a wholly exceptional phenomenon.[8] Even within the genre of dream interpretation it is remarkable, as will be seen from a comparison with the Hippocratic *Regimens* 4, which is devoted to what different dream images signify for a person's health. The many dreams analysed never refer to the status of the dreamer and take it for granted that he enjoys sufficient money and control over his own time to make elaborate provision for diet, exercise, relaxation and sleeping arrangements. Artemidorus, in contrast, offers us an exceptional opportunity to 'brush history against its grain' by disinterring not the experiences of the ruling class, but the experiences of what Walter Benjamin called in his justly famous *Theses on the Philosophy of History* (number 7) all those who performed the 'nameless drudgery' that allowed history to take place at all.

Since Foucault' drew attention to Artemidorus in *The Care of the* Self, the third volume of his *The History of Sexuality*, first published in French in 1984, several scholars have stressed the significance of Artemidorus' substantial text for the study of ancient psychosexual ideologies,[9] and indeed for the study of ancient slavery.[10] Kudlien's study of some aspects of dream divination in relation to his central topic of interest, what he calls the

Sklaven-Mentalität, carefully uses Artemidorus to build a picture of the emotional tensions that underlay ancient slave-owning households – the fear, distrust, paranoia, sexual tensions, and suppressed as well as enacted violence.[11] Yet by apparently abandoning the hope that we can access the experience of slaves themselves, rather than the general psychological ambience of households, Kudlien is not being as respectful to ancient slaves as Artemidorus himself seems to have been. Bradley, who is laudably open to the possibilities even unconventional source materials offer to the historian of slavery, devotes an important section in *Slavery and Society at Rome* (1994) to Artemidorus. Yet he seems to me to have been so understandably struck by the 'uniformly negative' associations of slavery in Artemidorus' semiotic system, and by even slaves' apparent acceptance of the ideology that construed them as 'in all senses a naturally inferior species', that he cannot be sensitive to the startling *contradictions* inherent in the dream-book's configuration of slaves' psychological humanity.[12]

Artemidorus's findings are largely organised according to categories of phenomena that appear in dreams -- parts of the body, items of clothing, types of weather and so on. The book is designed to make it possible to consult it in order to look up the meaning of a particular dream, as well as to be read straight through by a trainee dream interpreter like his own son, to whom part of the work is addressed. Artemidorus claims to have been given his good grasp of the subject of dreams from 'experience' (*peira*, 1.1); he has 'not only taken special pains to produce every book on the interpretation of dreams', but has also 'consorted with the much-despised diviners of the market-place,' professionals often dismissed as charlatans or buffoons. He has 'patiently listened to old dreams and their consequences' in the cities of Greece and at religious festivals there, in Asia, in Italy, and in the larger islands' (see also the prologue to book 5). He offers the reader excellent evidence on his profession generally, warning, for example, that fraudulent dream interpreters make false claims, such as that the whereabouts of runaway slaves can be deduced from elaborate quotations of poetry in dreams (4.63).

Artemidorus thinks within a broadly Stoic tradition of dream analysis, and therefore does not accept that dreams may have an origin external to the soul, for example in the special homeland of dreams which features in some ancient literature (*Odyssey* 24.12, Hesiod *Theog*. 212, Ovid, *Met*. 11.613-15).[13] The most important concepts underlying his work are, first, that dreams are predictive not retrospective (like most people in antiquity he saw dream analysis primarily as a form of divination). Secondly, his theories result from a combination of personal experience , transmitted experience (*historiē*), and the application of the basic principle that dream interpretation 'is nothing other than the juxtaposition of similarities' (2.25, i.e. analogy, *hē tou homoiou metabasis*); a slave, for example, might be represented by a mouse because he lives with the householder, and eats his scraps (***). Thirdly, it is crucial for the interpreter to know the dreamer's 'identity, occupation, birth, financial status, state of health, and age' (1.9). This is because Artemidorus has a sensibly relativist model of human happiness, and is well aware that the same symbol might mean different things in different minds, especially minds belonging to people of radically different status: 'Olive trees whose fruit has been gathered up means good luck for all but slaves, for whom it means thrashings, since it is by blows that the fruit is taken down' (2.25). Another example is the apparently common dream experienced by pregnant women that they give birth to a snake. In a free woman this dream can often have a positive predictive force, but in a slave woman it can only mean that the child will become a runaway, 'because a snake does not follow a straight path' (4.67). Artemidorus is also clear that a single event which would benefit one person would injure another, for example, the death of a slave owner, which would be bad for him but could be good for his slaves (****). He is also aware that ethnicity will affect the sign system used in any one individual's dreams (1.8); the first example he gives here is that, among the Thracians, tattoos mean good birth to one tribe and slave status to another.

Lastly, Artemidorus believes that there are fundamentally two types of significant dream. Those which are allegorical substitute one image for another (e.g. a mouse or a foot for a slave). But some dreams, those that are *theorematic*, are in 'realist' rather than

allegorical mode since what you see is what you get. Sometimes in dreams a mouse is just a mouse. In the prologue to Book 4, Artemidorus writes:

> The masses do not have the same dreams (*enhupnia*) as men who know how to interpret dreams. The masses see exactly what it is they desire or dread in dreams, whereas experts dream symbolically... A frightened man who knows about dreams and is a runaway slave will not dream of the actual man, but that he is e.g. escaping from a wild animal. And a dream that you find a runaway slave (4.1) can be *theorematic* (i.e. literally true), or *allegorical.*

That is, a runaway slave may or may not be an expert in oneirocriticism, but his degree of expertise will determine whether he dreams he is being pursued by his furious owner or by a wild animal. Equally, someone who dreams that they find a runaway slave may be about to find a runaway slave, or to experience something which, in the language of dreams, the runaway slave symbolically replaces.

This introduction to Artemidorus, however brief, still shows that slaves play a prominent part in his discussion even of general principles, that he can conceive of a slave with expertise in dream interpretation, and that his work assumes that slave dreams merit analysis alongside those of higher status individuals. This is in itself significant, since in Homer only persons of royal status dream, a tradition that continued into Latin epic,[14] while in Greek tragedy, with one exception, only aristocrats' dreams merit discussion.[15] Moreover, such dreams do not involve such under-privileged persons as slaves. This elite bias stands in marked contrast to the class-conscious dream experienced in Sumerian legend by Sharrumkin (later Sargon of Akkad) when he was lowly cupbearer to the king of Kish, a dream in which his master was drowned in a river of blood. This foretold accurately that Sharrumkin would replace the king on the throne.[16] Yet the exclusively aristocratic focus of the Greek epic and tragic presentation of dreams is certainly not evident in Artemidorus' dream book, in which well over one hundred of the dreams are of direct relevance to the perception of slavery in the second century CE, at least to the perception of domestic slaves,

living cheek-by-jowl with their master's families, who are the only slaves whose precise role is discussed. Although 'captives' feature generically in his writing, he does not refer specifically either to agricultural slaves on large estates or industrial slaves working in, for example, mines. It was presumably easier for domestic slaves living near urban centres or in attendance at festivals to be in a position, financial and physical, to consult a dream critic in the first place.

In his fifth and final book, Artemidorus offers short accounts of ninety-five dreams which he knows have actually come true. Three of them were dreamt by slaves. In these three cases we may therefore be in the most unusual position of being able to enjoy direct access to images produced in the minds of ancient slaves, as well as the manner in which their dreams were interpreted. The first reads as follows (5.23)

> A man dreamt that one star fell out of the sky while another star ascended into the sky. The dreamer was someone's house-slave (*oiketēs*). When his master died, he thought he was free and without any master. But it came to light that his former master had a son, and he was forced to become his slave. The fallen star therefore stood for the man who died, while the one that ascended into the sky signified the one who would control him and be his master.

These few unadorned sentences of Greek prose contain a desperately sad little story of one slave's briefly held belief that he had become a free man. His disappointment on discovering that he was legally compelled to serve another man, much younger than his previous owner, can only be imagined. For a rare, brief moment we may be in intimate touch with the inner psychological world of an actual ancient slave owned by men of two different generations of a family somewhere in the Roman Empire. But his predictive dream of the simultaneous falling and rising stars also presents a stubborn knot of problems to the historian of slavery. It is with defining and addressing four of the headings under which these fundamental problems fall that this article is primarily concerned: (1) the status of dream as evidence, (2) the hermeneutic problems caused by our different, culturally determined ideas about

dreams, (3) the generic features of the dream-book, and (4) the difficulty in disentangling the subject-object relationships in the process of dream interpretation.

The first issue is simply the ontological and epistemological status of any dream as 'historical' evidence.[17] Dreams do not have a material form, at least until they are written down by a dream interpreter like Artemidorus. Dreams, as records of the non-conscious or subconscious activity of the mind, do not relate to truth and experience of the world in the same way as, for example, memories, experienced when the subject is conscious and reprocessing images of empirically discerned reality and occurrences. In terms of affinities with types of literature, the content of a narrated memory has more in common with historiography and biography, since the 'rules' governing the physical laws of the remembered world will exclude the paranormal or supernatural, while the content of a narrated dream shares much with myth and fiction. Although the dreams recorded by Artemidorus are for the most part remarkably free of surreal or paranormal features, which he indeed (in marked contrast to modern psychoanalysts) regarded as of little value and therefore dismissed as evidence that could be used in divination,[18] the third of the specific slaves' dreams that were proven to be prophetically correct in Artemidorus' fifth book certainly contains imagery that is reminiscent of the world of mythical prodigies (5.91):

> Someone dreamt that he had three penises. He happened to be a slave and he was freed and acquired three names instead of one, adding the two names of the man who had freed him.

Here, the subconscious mind of the slave in question is said to be working through the very real specifics of how his identity, on his release in his imperial city, would be created anew by formal means of nomenclature, but this question of identity politics is expressed in a somatic prodigy (see also 1.45, where Artemidorus says that this dream was very rare and to his knowledge had only ever been experienced on this one occasion). Indeed, Artemidorus acknowledges elsewhere in the book that the imaginative landscapes and events of dreams are often closely related to people's knowledge of myths, and even to their knowledge of

specific works of literature: the deterioration in a relationship between a woman and her slave girl was presaged, for example, by her dream about the conflict between Hermione and Andromache in Euripides' *Andromache* (4.59).[19]

Yet it could be argued that it is not in the content of the dream, in terms of imagery and its relationship with empirical reality, that its importance as historical evidence lies. Perhaps it is in the psychological *concern* that the dream addresses, or at least is interpreted as addressing. Both the 'stars' dream and the 'penises' dream are interpreted by Artemidorus and/or his source, who may or may not have been the slave dreamer himself, as directly addressing the slave's status as slave. One dream predicts that the slave will falsely believe himself to have been freed, while the other predicts that the slave will actually be freed, as the dreams Eunus reported to his Sicilian fellow-slaves presumably did. On this evidence, the subconscious mental activity of at least some slaves was (unsurprisingly) preoccupied with the fact of their servitude and their hopes for release from it. The third slave's dream in Artemidorus' fifth book is not, however, about liberation (5.85).

> A slave (*doulos*) dreamt that he received a cooked egg from his mistress, and that he threw away the shell while keeping the yolk. His mistress happened to be pregnant. She subsequently gave birth to a baby. While the mistress herself died, the child was brought up, on the orders of her husband, by the man who had experienced the dream. Thus the container was thrown away and of no value, while the contents provided a livelihood for the man who had experienced the dream.

The dream, like the 'stars' dream, does involve the question of a drastic change in a slave's status caused by his owner's death. But the change in status is not from slavery to freedom. The implication seems to be that the slave, although not emancipated, was not unhappy to be trusted sufficiently to be awarded means of subsistence for himself as well as the dead woman's baby, along with, perhaps, a degree of independence.

Curiously, the image of the hard-boiled egg occurs in an ancient dream about child-rearing and a trusted slave the authenticity of which no scholar to my knowledge has ever doubted, because it is recorded autobiographically by the canonical classical writer Aelius Aristides. On one his travels in pursuit of health, he dreamt that he saw his nurse (*trophos*) with his foster sister Callityche, and she brought him what he first thought were apples but later saw were boiled and peeled eggs (*Sacred Tales* 1.45). He later says that says that no one was dearer to him than this aged nurse, and that her name was Philoumene (1.78). The owner-slave relationship is, by this free dreamer, couched in the language of affect and sensibility. But in Artemidorus, beneath the apparently happy outcome and the quaintly culinary image there lurk the menace of economic reality and the dependence of many slaves, regardless of whether they were freed or not, on the continued economic wellbeing and goodwill of their owners or former owners. It is not clear from the information provided what would have happened to this slave dreamer on the demise of his mistress otherwise.

Indeed, the 'sources' from which Artemidorus provided these fleeting glimpses into the psychosocial consequences of slavery are always precarious. The treatise includes discussions both of what an object might signify in a hypothetical dream and records of actual dreams that have either been told to Artemidorus himself or that he has learned about from other sources. He uses several different linguistic formulae to introduce his account of a dream, for example '*edoxe tis*', 'it seemed to someone' [sc. e.g. 'that he was flying'], without specifying from what source he, as dream interpreter, knows about this dream. An example here is one of the numerous dreams recorded in the treatise that presage enslavement in a free dreamer (4.65),

> Someone dreamt (*edoxe tis*) that he had sexual intercourse with a piece of iron just as you would with a woman. He was condemned to slavery and was enchained in iron, and had, as it were, intercourse with it.

The dream is unlike any other in the treatise, and the concreteness of the image combined with its distinctiveness may, despite the vagueness of the introductory formula, suggest that

Artemidorus is drawing on an experience recorded by another dream interpreter even if not by Artemidorus himself. But in another common formula, 'I know someone to whom it seemed' [that he was, for example, flying], where the Greek formula is *oida tina hos edoxen*, it is perverse to deny that Artemidorus has personal knowledge of the dreamer, since that is indeed the normal meaning of *oida* with the accusative of a person.[20]

Two dreams which do fall into this category, fascinatingly, reveal two free men whom Artemidorus knows and who have clearly been concerned about the sexual status (and availability to women) of male slaves in their possession, or rather about the consequent erosion or eradication of the hierarchy dividing free from slave. In the first example, Artemidorus says (1.26),

> I know someone who dreamt his eyes fell out and dropped to his feet. Nevertheless, he did not go blind. Instead, he married his daughters to his slaves, and in this way the better was mixed with the worse.

Two body parts – eyes and feet – signify this free man's daughters and slaves respectively, and their unnatural proximity in the dream symbolises what, it is implied, is an inappropriate mating in reality. In the second instance, the man whom Artemidorus says he knows (3.51) 'was crippled in his right foot. He dreamt that his slave was crippled in the same foot and limped in the same fashion. He caught his slave with his own female lover (*erōmenē*)... The dream was telling him that his slave would err in the same way as he did.' The ever-present potential for slaves to become sexual partners, and discomfiture with the idea that they might have sexual feelings towards women with important roles in their owners' lives, are thus acknowledged in their owners' dreams. It is important to notice this alongside and as a partial corrective to the pervasive elision of masters with the 'masculine' penetrative agency in sexual relationships, and slaves with the 'feminine', penetrated passivity, an elision brilliantly documented by Winkler in a pathbreaking article.[21] Amongst the dreams described by Artemidorus, none can easily be seen as expressing such desire, from the *slave*'s point of view, as the story of the slave Aesop's affair with his master's wife in

the ancient biography of Aesop may well do, if that tradition did indeed emerge from an oral tradition of story-telling at the lower end of the social spectrum.[22] Yet the best evidence for a slave dream articulating such a desire comes in a Christian text written in the same century as Artemidorus' book, the *Shepherd* of Hermas. Hermas opens this visionary work by telling his dream in which the same woman, Rhode, appeared to him as he had once felt aroused by when, as her slave at Rome, he helped her out of the Tiber after she had been bathing (*Vis.* 1.1.4-9).[23]

The few dreams recounted in some detail and over more than one sentence form another category where either direct experience or anecdote has played a role. In one outstanding dream of this kind (4.69), the dreamer's desire to 'talk back' to his master is interpreted as having been given only thinly veiled expression:

> A slave dreamt that he was playing ball with Zeus. He quarrelled with his master, and, since he took certain liberties in his speech, he antagonised the man. For Zeus signified the master. The ball-playing indicated both the exchange of words on an equal footing and the quarrel itself.

When combined with the provision of proper names, detail may indeed suggest that we should take the slave's dream seriously. In a section on dreams whose predictive force could not have been diagnosed at the time the dreams occurred but was later validated, for example, he offers 'Syros, the slave of Antipater', who 'dreamt that he had no soles on the undersides of his feet. He was burnt alive' (4.24). Here neither the nomenclature nor even the status of slave is strictly speaking relevant to the point at issue. Since Artemidorus has just been talking about Alexander the Great, perhaps this Syros was the slave of Antipater of Sidon, and Artemidorus had found the dream in the historiographical tradition that had built up around Alexander. Dreams accounts which concretely mention a particular place also suggests that a real dream ultimately lies behind a record in Artemidorus' dream-book, especially since he insists that the dream interpreter needs expert local knowledge. Artemidorus, who was himself born in Ephesus, records that a prostitute of slave status was

freed and became able to give up the sex trade after she dreamt that she had entered Artemis' temple (4.4), 'for she would not have been allowed to enter the shrine if she had not given up prostitution'.

A further category of dream of which we ought not be too quick to dismiss the authenticity is the type of dream which Artemidorus says 'many people' have experienced. A striking case here is the dream of decapitation (1.35). Artemidorus discusses what it means if a slave dreams that he is beheaded. If he falls into the category of slave trusted by his master (a category which looms large in the dream book, as we shall see further below pp. 000), then this dream foretells that he will lose that all-important trust, since condemned men are said to be 'headless' (*akephalos*) and nobody trusts such a person:

> But to all other slaves the dream signifies freedom. For the head is master of the body, and when it is cut off, it signifies a slave separated from the master who will be free. But many (*polloi*) who have had this dream have only been sold.

The terse final sentence here is suggestive. Many slaves have dreamt that their masters were decapitated (and some modern dream analysts would certainly infer that this was an articulation of the suppressed rage that slaves must have had to deal with on a permanent basis). But in Artemidorus' day the headless master offered the slave dreamer the hope that he would be freed. Unfortunately, he seems to have heard of 'many' cases in which these hopes were frustrated. Perhaps the psyches of slaves who knew something about dream interpretation could even subconsciously produce optimistic dreams apparently predicting their liberation far more often than such aspirations were ever likely to be fulfilled.

There is one more category of dream which does not deserve undue scepticism on the part of the modern scholar, and that is the type of dream common enough to have attracted, by Artemidorus' day, a large bibliography. In the course of his treatise Artemidorus mentions a substantial number of other dream critics, from the classical period to his own day; the interpretation of certain dreams had attracted a considerable controversy. The

dream of a thunderbolt strike, Artemidorus tells us (2.9), has always been held to predict a change in status and fortune, since 'whatever has been struck by a thunderbolt loses its characteristic properties'. But then he says that later writers including 'Alexander of Myndus and Phoebus of Antioch' have discussed what such a dream might mean to a slave. Some maintained that it was a good sign, and would signify that they would no longer have masters and would no longer toil, since there was a tradition, apparently, that slaves struck by thunderbolts were allowed to wear the clothes of the manumitted and to be honoured like freedmen on the ground that Zeus had honoured them. But the debate has never been resolved, says Artemidorus, who proposes the following solution: the dream signifies freedom for slaves who are not trusted or honoured by their masters. But for those that are, it means that they will lose the trust, honour, and possessions that flow from that trust.

Three things of interest emerge here. First, these are quite subtle distinctions and imply discontent on the behalf of slaves when predictions of imminent liberation have not been fulfilled. Secondly, we see Artemidorus falling back, as often, on his favourite distinction between the distrusted slave and his trusted counterpart (who may of course have been relatively well treated and less desperate to be freed). And thirdly, we have lost a substantial ancient literature on slaves and society in the form of earlier dream-books, a literature of which Artemidorus' work must only represent the tip of a very interesting iceberg.

Artemidorus' interest in dreams, and the skill in interpreting them on which he prided himself, have produced extreme reactions in some recent scholars. These seem to be related to each scholar's own preparedness to take the practice of psychological analysis of any kind at all seriously. Harris dismisses him 'a man of monumental gullibility,[24] an assessment forged in opposition to Miller's admiration for his conscientiousness and 'associative genius'.[25] Bowersock thinks that he is a 'snob', while Walde regards him as 'very erudite'.[26] But fighting about Artemidorus' intellect means forgetting the dreamers about whom he writes, which is simply to compound the neglect suffered by slaves at the hands of

history. Given that we have no particular reason to doubt the authenticity at least of the dreams which have been discussed so far, our time is better spent in addressing the second acute problem that ancient slave dreams, in common with all ancient dreams, present to the modern scholar. This problem is actually a magnified version of the fundamental methodological challenge besetting the practice of all ancient history – can we discuss a past culture in contemporary conceptual language at all? In one sense, it is easier to discuss ancient practices which no longer exist today (for example, divination from the livers of sacrificial animals) precisely because there are no intrusive contemporary prejudices about what mottled splodges mean on a liver to obscure our understanding of what mottled splodges might have meant to someone in the second century CE. We are inclined to try to analyse ancient dreams according to our own beliefs about dream symbolism, since very great importance has been attached to dreams over the last century or so by psychoanalysts and those who popularise their work. But Sigmund Freud did not write an *Interpretation of Liver Markings* that can stand between us and ancient hepatoscopy.

For Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) and its epigones themselves bequeath two huge and inter-related problems to the aspiring user of Artemidorus as a document of social history. The first is the misconception that because Freud thought that dreams expressed unconscious desires, or rather discharged in veiled form primitive impulses, many of which were erotic, an ancient dream-book will tell us a good deal about the primitive impulses revealed in ancient psyches.[27] The characterisation in Plato's *Republic* of the 'animal' part of the soul getting the better of our self-control and reason while we are asleep, and having licentious flings which include incest and murder, is likely to encourage such an expectation (9.571***). On one level this is true, since a substantial proportion of the dreams described by Artemidorus, especially but not exclusively in the section on sex in his first book (1.78-82), do indeed involve sexual activity. Artemidorus envisages the possibility of men dreaming about sexual intercourse with wives, prostitutes, siblings, parents, sons, daughters, older men, younger men, gods, goddesses, corpses, animals and both male and female slaves. Almost every sexual position is discussed, along with masturbation and oral sex. But

the *meaning* of all these erotic dreams, like the meaning of the dreams in all the other categories, is hardly ever about sexual activity: it is about changes in *power* relative to other individuals, or in status, health, wealth, domicile, and about the outcome of lawsuits or other business negotiations. Even a dream about a penis can indicate 'poverty, slavery, and bonds, because it is also called "the obligatory thing" (*anagkaion*) and is a symbol of necessity' (*anagkē*), the cosmic principle which had always been associated with slavery in the Greek mind.

People *may* have had a good deal of erotic dreams in antiquity, but they did not, apparently, think that these dreams had much to do with eros. Typically, to dream of having sexual intercourse with one's own slave, male or female, signifies that the dreamer will take pleasure in his possessions (*ktēmata*), because slaves are one kind of possession. If the slave is the figure in the dream who sexually penetrates his owner/the dreamer, then this will mean a shift in the balance of power in which the slave comes to look down on the master (1.78). The ancients had sexual dreams, which we may be tempted to interpret as being about intimate libidinal urges, but the ancients interpreted them as referring to relative status, power and wealth in a much more widely defined and often public sphere. The Presocratic Heraclitus may famously have said, 'The waking have one world in common, whereas each sleeper turns away into a private world of his own' (89 B 15 DK), but Artemidorus interprets dreams emphatically in terms of the power structures in the world experienced in common by people when awake.

The temptation to interpret ancient dreams as evidence of the ancient subconscious rather than evidence of the ancient preoccupation with social advancement, a preoccupation of which the dreamers were presumably perfectly conscious in their *waking* lives, points to the second hazard presented by the Freudian legacy. We may even be unaware of the interference in our thinking about ancient dreams caused by Freud's writings, since despite 'sporadic attempts to reinstate a 19th-century scientific disdain of dreams, Freud's influence is now so pervasive as to be almost invisible.'[28] We need to be very careful not to read

ancient dreams in the hopes of acting as a psychoanalyst who can reveal what the ancient subconscious mind indicated, as some Freud-influenced scholars have (with very little success) been tempted to do.[29] This is more difficult than it sounds, since so many of the ancient dreams do seem to contain the kind of imagery in which Freudian analysts have traditionally been interested, for example the dreams about eggs and penises, as well as the several dreams in Artemidorus about flying, birth, death, houses, significant numerals, and verbal puns. We know, admittedly, that Freud had studied Artemidorus, along with 19th-century classical scholarship on the ancient dream tradition,[30] and therefore may therefore have been prompted by contact with the ancient source to 'look for' eggs, penises, flying and puns in his clients' dreams. But the appearance of such content in Artemidorus makes it quite impossible to evade the thorny question of the extent to which, if at all, the experience and content of dreams are universal, transcending all cultural and historical differences.

Our very word *dream* – Freud's titular *Traum* – does not mean the same as Artemidorus' titular *oneiros* or indeed the other terms, such as *onar*, *hupar* and *opsis*, which he uses from time to time.[31] By *oneiros* Artemidorus seems to mean a particular subcategory of significant dream, with predictive force, which he in turn distinguishes from the *enhupnion*. This is what he holds to be an insignificant dream about the dreamer's immediate (rather than future) experiences, especially bodily ones to do with food, illness, and very intimate relationships (1.1). There are also passages in the treatise where he seems to acknowledge little difference between dreams experienced while asleep and visions experienced when awake. But even more significant than the lexical issue is the issue of the universality or otherwise of the *content* of dreams. We dream about receiving messages on the telephone, which had not been invented in Artemidorus' day, while his clients dreamt about being visited by Apollo. Dreamscapes are clearly susceptible to absorbing images from the contingent, historically specific culture of the dreamer: the question, therefore, is whether *any* of the symbols in dreams, let alone their meaning, remains unchanged across time and culture. When it comes to a peculiar institution such as slavery, of which most of us

will thankfully today have no direct personal experience, but which might be expected to have profound psychological implications, what are we to make of its relation to dreams reported from many centuries ago? It is vital to keep an open mind about the type of content and interpretation Artemidorus offers, even when the dreams seem bizarre or disproportionately focussed on non-surreal elements which can seem 'undreamlike' to us.

Even amongst modern psychoanalysts, there is very little agreement about the correct way to interpret dreams, or even about their actual significance.[32] Although some analysts believe that dreams can reveal impulses dating back to the analysand's infancy, and are thus in a sense retrospective, there are others who believe that dreams process the events merely of the previous day, or address immediate anxieties, or even that under some circumstances they can be predictive insofar as the preconscious mind can pick up signals invisible to – or evaded – by the conscious mind: Budd cites a the patient who dreamt of a multitude of red and soldiers fighting, the night before being diagnosed as suffering from leukaemia.[33] When it comes to pre-Freudian traditions of dream interpretation in civilisations other than the Greek and Roman worlds, we also, inevitably, find major differences.

Yet in the Chinese dream tradition, for example, we find a tendency similar to Artemidorus' to interpret the meaning of dreams as completely dependent on the social status of the dreamer: in a text from the same century as Artemidorus, which includes a long discussion of dreams compiled during the Eastern Han Dynasty, the author Wang Fu stressed that the content of dreams was heavily influenced by the dreamer's social status and role.[34] A statement almost identical to Artemidorus' programmatic comment on status in 1.9 (see above p. 000) also appears in Chen Shiyan's treatise on dream interpretation *Mengzhan yizhi*, completed in around 1562, which includes nearly seven hundred dreams collected over a period of many centuries.[35] Moreover, the dreams which talk about slavery reflect very similar concerns as those from the Antonine world. The slave-owner Mr. Yin of Zhou, ran a large estate:

> Amongst his workers was someone who would dream at night of being the ruler of a state whose happiness was beyond compare. Yet Mr Yin would dream at night that he had become a slave who was ordered to every kind of task while suffering no end of beatings.[36]

In the first century CE, the tyrannical wife of a self-proclaimed provincial governor named Peng Chong was plagued by nightmares adumbrating the couple's brutal assassination by three of their household slaves.[37] It seems that in ancient China as well as the ancient Mediterranean, slaves dreamed of freedom and high status, slave-owners expressed their own terror of enslavement in dreams, and drastic falls from high estate were heralded by dreams involving slaves. Perhaps reading ancient dream-books in search of information about slavery is better served by comparative evidence from other slave-holding societies than the psychoanalytical couches of the post-Freudian western world.[38]

The third serious set of problems facing the historian using Artemidorus are generic, since they are created by the assumptions and conceptual framework underlying his genre. Even these formal, literary issues do not allow us to stray far from the question of social class, however. It is essential to address the fundamental issue of the readership to which Artemidorus must have supposed the genre of dream-book would appeal, and his wider constituency both in terms of the people whose previous dream experiences have ended up in his book, and the people whose dreams may be subsequently be interpreted, directly or indirectly, with its help. Here the evidence is certainly confusing, but Artemidorus' systematic inclusion of what certain types of dream might mean for slaves, whose ubiquity in the ancient world is so routinely ignored in so many other types of ancient writing, simply can't be dismissed. It seems quite certain to me, from the evidence in Artemidorus alone, that ancient slaves wanted to have their dreams interpreted, and that the scores of references to them in the dream book is a reflection of this historical reality. Perhaps the aspirational attitude of slaves which the book implies, as well as their personal and financial freedom actually to consult an oneirocritic, is related to the specific historical times. Artemidorus

travelled throughout large areas of the Roman Empire during a period of relative peace and prosperity, when legislation had curtailed some of the very worst atrocities that could be committed against slaves. Hadrian had put a stop to penal servitude for both slaves and freedmen, prohibited the sale of both male and female slaves to the gladiatorial schools, and had decreed that masters no longer had the right to punish their slaves with death.

Alternatively, we could see slaves' interest in dreams as a more longstanding historical phenomenon. Although, as we have noticed, certain genres such as epic and tragedy associate dreams with upper-class people, in other, less elevated genres, the class associations of an interest in dreams are very different. Aristophanes' *Wasps* notoriously opens with two slaves, Sosias and Xanthias, decoding what is signified by the animals and birds they have seen in their dreams in ways that are startling (given the speakers' non-citizen status) for the acuity of their insights into Assembly politics. One of the great strengths of Harris' recent book on dreams in antiquity is that he demonstrates the diversity of ancient opinions on the value (or insignificance) of dreams and the intellectual respectability (or dubiousness) of interest in their contents. There were many highly educated writers, for example Polybius, who considered dreams to be entirely worthless, and people who concerned themselves with dream to be either womanish or extremely vulgar.[39] The Epicurean Lucretius chides the superstitious for setting any store by the dreams with which soothsayers terrorise them (*de Rerum natura* 1.102-6). As we saw at the opening of this chapter, Diodorus regarded the dreams with which Eunus aroused his fellow slaves to revolt as the cynical inventions of a man manipulating the passions of some of the most wretched and least educated people imaginable. This seems to present the political use of dreams in a similar light as the passage in Aristophanes' *Knights* where the rival demagogues compete in trying to win the support of the demos through dream prophecies (1090-5).[40] On the other hand, wisdom figures of great authority sometimes treat dreams with respect, from the moment when Socrates tells Crito that a beautiful woman announced to him in a solemn dream that he would die (*Crito* 44a-b), apparently the first ancient Greek epiphany dream afforded to an individual of less than royal status.[41] Aristotle, who is clear that dreams are

not created by the intellectual or rational or even the cognitive parts of the soul (*On Dreams* 1.459a 8-11), says without any apparent derision that prescient and vivid dreams are often experienced by very ‘common or garden’ (*euteleis*) sorts of men because they are communicative and emotional and therefore susceptible to stimuli (*On Prophecy in Sleep* 2.463b 15-18).

Taking dreams seriously, then, was perhaps a phenomenon that had always had a tendency to cross class boundaries. At one end of the spectrum there may always have been many high-minded Platonists like Synesius of Cyrene, in whose *Concerning Dreams* it is argued dreams can put one in touch with the eternal world of ideas, while at the other perhaps there is truth in the implied customer-base in Artemidorus’ text – drawn from across the socially diverse, and highly aspirant, populations inhabiting all kinds of different households in busy imperial cities. We saw earlier that Artemidorus entertained seriously the concept of a runaway slave who was knowledgeable about dreams (4.1, see above p. 000), and this accords with the assumption in several other ancient sources, for example Plautus’ comedies, that anyone can learn to interpret dreams,[42] and in which dreamers include a pimp, a prostitute, and a *senex comicus*.[43] A dream of a Roman peasant about a ritual involving a slave was part of the aetiological tradition surrounding the Ludi Votivi Maximi (Cicero, *On Divination* I.xxvi.55-6).[44] The fragmentary 8th *Mimiamb* of Herodas seems to involve a woman waking up her female slaves and telling one of them her dream. Perhaps the dream experienced by the lowly slave Aesop at the beginning of his ancient *Life*, in which the goddess Isis appears with the Muses to him in a parodic refashioning of the epiphanies traditionally experienced by great canonical authors, crystallises the class tensions underpinning the phenomenon of ancient dream interpretation.[45] This would apply especially if this story of social rise of the clever slave, a poor man’s folk hero, were a product, as many scholars believe, of an oral tradition that had developed amongst the very lowest echelons of society (see above ***). And it is just possible that some people in antiquity associated excellence at dream interpretation with the exoticised ‘barbarian wisdom’ that also associated some kinds of magician and herbalist with the foreign lands that happened to

produce many slaves (see Cicero, *On Divination* I.xxiii.46-7). In 19th-century North America dream books were sometimes deliberately marketed as having particular mystical authority because written 'antebellum' by women 'of color'.[46]

A further genre-based hazard affecting the way we read Artemidorus is that his approach is conditioned by the widespread second-century penchant for writings of an encyclopaedic nature, and he is keen to offer a comprehensive account of the types of image that appear in what he regards as significant dreams.[47] In order to impose an intelligible order on his subject-matter, and presumably one which would enable a reader to locate a discussion of a particular dream-image quickly and easily, Artemidorus uses a taxonomy which arranges the images a dreamer might experience into certain empirical categories – types of animal or bird, for example, or epiphanies of particular gods. This means that we are given a grid of the world as seen by Artemidorus' contemporaries in which large areas of experience were organised into relations with each other in ways that were felt to be equivalent to a sliding scale of social statuses from king down to poor man, prisoner and slave. In dreams where the symbolism pertains to the body, for example, the head indicates a father, the foot indicates a slave, the right hand indicates a father, son, male friend, or brother; the left hand a mother, mistress, daughter, or sister; the penis indicates parents, wife or children, and the shin indicates a wife or mistress (1.2).

In the animal world, masters are unsurprisingly represented by traditionally regal creatures such as lions and eagles, while donkeys and timorous little birds signify slaves. Such symbols are, in isolation from other symbols, often said to mean the same to free people and slaves, underlining that the fundamental semiotics of dreams transcend class boundaries. For Artemidorus (2.68), flying with wings is auspicious for all men alike. 'The dream signifies freedom for slaves, since all birds fly without a master and have no-one above them… For slaves, dreaming that one is flying up into the heavens always signifies that they will pass into more distinguished homes, and frequently even into the court of a king.'

Similarly, a dream of being harnessed to a cart like a four-footed animal, regardless of the dreamer's current status, foretells slavery, drudgery, and illness (3.18).

Yet there is a limit to slave's comparability with free people, expressed in another, altogether contradictory assumption that the inner world of slaves was so extremely distorted by their 'social death' that some dream symbols signify the *exact opposite* in the psyche of a slave and a free person. Thus (2.54) for a rich man dreaming of fighting wild beasts is bad, but for slaves it signifies freedom, provided that they are killed by the beasts, thus annihilating their incomplete personhood under slavery. It is usually bad to dream that you are carried, but it *is* auspicious for a house slave to dream he is being carried by his master (2.56). Dreaming of a shipwreck portends harm for all but those who are being forcibly detained or slaves, to whom it indicates that they will be released from those who detain them (2.23). The yoke is a good sign for all but slaves, for whom it means an obstacle to their freedom (2.24). The life of a slave is so very distorted, so out of kilter with 'normal' human experience as rationally intuited, that images which in dreams almost universally have negative meanings sometimes become positive for slaves, and vice versa. This is most conspicuous of all in dreams involving sex roles, especially the dream of a man that he changes into a woman (***). For a rich man or a statesman this dream augurs ill, because women stay at home and it will signify the end of his public life. But since slaves have no access to public life anyway, it can actually mean 'a less painful servitude, since women's labours are less arduous'.[48]

These fundamentally contradictory messages mirror the contradictions inherent in the status of slave, understood as a human with a subjective viewpoint on relationships and with similar aspirations to social ascent as a free person, but whose personhood is also compromised in fundamentally ways. Yet, taken as a whole, the most noticeable thing about the slaves' dreams in Artemidorus is the degree to which their interpretations are *circumscribed*. If we are to believe Artemidorus' analyses, the dream life of slaves was under unremitting pressure from their waking status. One of the most unpleasant features of the

dream-book is the number of different symbols that predict to a slave dreamer that he or she will suffer violence from his master: this applies to beef, because both straps and whips are made of oxhide (1.70), dancing, because a beating sets a slave's body in motion (1.76), being aroused to an erection by one's master, because a flogging 'extends' the body (1.78), harvested olive trees 'since it is by blows that the fruit is taken down' (2.25), hemp because 'it is cut down and twisted' (3.59), as well as to mountains, glens, valleys, chasms, and woods (****).

On a more optimistic note, there are no fewer than 26 slave dreams, besides the 'three penises' dream discussed above, pretending freedom. Freedom could also be suggested by a dream in which a slave serves as a soldier (1.5), is awarded the free status of ephebe (1.54), that he has one or no ears (1.24), since this signifies release from the demands of authority, or no teeth (1.31), since the teeth represent both the master who provides the nourishment to his slave and, paradoxically, the nourishment that a slave's labour can provide to a master. Other emancipation dreams include those in which the dreamer is turned into brass (1.50), sees a statue of himself erected in the market-place (1.50), blows on a sacred trumpet, acts as a herald (1.56), rides through the city on horseback, runs the sprint in the athletics competition (1.58), is crowned as victor in pancration (1.62) or garlanded with date-palm or olive (only permitted to free men, 1.77), enjoys fellatio from a rich free woman (1.79), or practises fellatio on himself (1.80). Wearing a purple robe (2.3) means good luck for both slaves and for rich men. For slaves, it signifies freedom, since slaves are not permitted to wear it.

Freedom was also predicted for a slave who dreamt that he was dead, or being carried out for burial, provided that he was not a slave entrusted with the care of the house (2.49). Yet for a slave who is trusted with supervision of the house, the dream is not so propitious, for it signifies loss of the trusteeship. One of the interesting things about the accounts of dreams experienced by slaves is, in fact, the degree to which the subconscious mind was felt to carry over intra-household distinctions between higher and lower status

slaves. Everyone who has ever had any dealings with captivity of any kind will understand the importance that the pecking order assumes where access to ordinary freedoms and pleasures is curtailed. The most chilling example is 2.15, in which Artemidorus reports that he knows of a household slave who dreamt that he struck some frogs with his fist. The man became overseer of his master's house and took charge of the other slaves in the house. For the pond represented the house; the frogs, the other slaves; the punch, his command over them. The complexity of the pecking order in the average household is best illustrated by the murder dreams in 4.64. A slave who dreamt that that he was murdered by his master was in fact freed by him. But another man, who dreamt that he was murdered by a fellow slave, was not freed, because the slave, unlike a master, did not have the power to set him free. Chillingly, Artemidorus adds that these two fellow slaves grew to hate each other, for 'murderers are not on friendly terms with their victims.'

Even within the complex generic structure and formal taxonomy of Artemidorus dream-book, therefore, it is possible to detect subtle contradictions in the logic, narrow circumscription of aspiration, and telling gradations of domestic hierarchy that offer us a fuller and more detailed picture of the ancient slave's psychosocial horizons than any other ancient document. The last problem on which I would like to focus is, however, is not a matter of the formal expectations of the dream-book at a type of writing, but would apply equally to authors in most other genres. This is the question of the degree to which we are entitled to believe that we are achieving access, in relation to a book written by a free man, to the subjectivity of the people about whom he writes at all. A sceptic would certainly stress that the dream interpreter is 'already working with a mediated and rationalized construct', the form and content of which depend 'on the competence and credibility of the narrator'.[49] On the other hand, subject/object relations in texts dealing with voices and subjectivities erased from the literary and historical record have in recent years become extremely controversial under the influence of feminist and postcolonial theorisation of literary narrative.[50] Artemidorus, as we have seen, offers interpretations of the symbolism in slaves'

dreams which overwhelmingly relate to the possibility of emancipation or being sold, the likelihood that they will suffer physical punishment, and the state of their relationships with their owners. It might be argued that far from being in contact with slaves' subjectivity, we are in contact with a man who, since he enjoyed the privileges of liberty, *assumed* that these issues are the only things slaves ever think about.

Such an argument would be the geneaological descendant of the conventional, Hegelian opposition of subject and object, which virtually defined consciousness as the incisive, masterful, knowing subject's experience of the passive, known object. It would certainly apply to the longsuffering, passive, and often dying slaves and slave dreamers that emanated from the psyches of some 18th- and 19th-century Abolitionists. A famous example is the old slave who is hanged because he is too old to labour, while a white woman continues impassively drinking tea, in the 1770 dream experienced by the New Jersey Quaker and abolitionist John Woolman and recorded in his diary.[51] A similar masterful authorial subject imagining an unfortunate slave object relationship underlies Longfellow's 1852 poem 'The slave's dream' (1842), even though the 'object' is the dreamer here:

> Beside the ungathered rice he lay,
> His sickle in his hand;
> His breast was bare, his matted hair
> Was buried in the sand.
> Again, in the mist and shadow of sleep,
> He saw his Native Land.[52]

Another example is the dream experienced by the dying Soudi, an African boy abducted by slavers in a story by the Victorian reformer Helen Pease.[53] But in texts from the same era dealing with 'real' slaves, the contribution of the slave 'objects' in texts by free 'subjects' authors has recently been radically reassessed, under the influence, primarily, of African American scholars. Of particular significance here is Robert Burns Stepto's study of black narrative, *From Behind the Veil* (1979). By analysing the biographical accounts of 19th-

century slaves, and the ways in which these narratives were indeed paternalistically framed, doctored and generally interfered with by white emancipationist writers and promoters, Stepto develops a critique of the whole notion of narrative control, a critique in which objects become subjects and subjects interact with other subjects.

With this in mind, we might more fruitfully read the apparently restricted psychological scope of Artemidorus' slave dreamers as both illuminating the brutal circumscription of their subjectively experienced lives, and demonstrating the plausible assumption that the slaves who took their dreams to interpreters articulated their own agency in pressing for answers which would relate to precisely these issues. This seems to me to be supported particularly by the extraordinary presence in the dream-book of two dreams that would actually encourage a slave who was thinking about running away, or indeed had already done so: non-migratory birds, such as the swallow and the house martin, signify that runaway slaves who were originally freeborn will return to their native land (4.56),[54] while a cuttlefish symbolises benefits for runaways because of the thick inky fluid that it often employs to make its escape (2.14).

What Artemidorus had to say about the dreamlife of slaves, which focused (like everyone else's) on improvements in status and the avoidance of suffering, is if nothing else a demonstration of his unusual premise that all humans are psychologically the same, regardless of their current position on the social scale, an assumption which must have been reinforced by his experience of real people, slave and free, in the real world. But Artemidorus' text is, of course, like all pagan Greco-Roman literature, informed by the fundamental intellectual contradictions which could never be resolved for as long as it was necessary to justify some individuals being possessed and oppressed by others. He is – although actually quite infrequently -- happy to reflect back on some free dreamers the extreme prejudices about the intellectual capacities of slaves that the dreamers' own self-interest required, for example the advice that pelicans signify that a runaway slave will be found near a river or pond, since pelicans 'signify senseless men who act without reason or

reflection' (2.20). In an even more striking example of recycled prejudice, he reproduces the widely held dualistic assumption that slaves analogically represent crude matter to the master's spirit, as beings of the physical world in relation to the transcendent, cerebral world of ideas represented by the slave-owning class. Artemidorus claims that one of the things slaves can mean in a dream is the body of their owners (*to sōma tōn despotōn*, 4.30):

> The same man who saw his slave in a high fever became ill himself, as might be expected. For the relationship of the slave to the man who had this dream is analogous to the relationship of the body to the soul (*to sōma pros tēn psuchēn*).

But this callous and commonplace abstract principle,[55] is everywhere in Artemidorus undermined to the point of effective cancellation by his actual *practice* of taking slave dreams seriously. The egalitarian form of the ancient dream book implicitly dismantles its hierarchical content. The soul – or psyche -- of the ancient slave was really there all the time.

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[1] See e.g. Black (1997) and Akbar (1984).

[2] Fairley (2003).

[3] Barbara Fletchman Smith, a psychoanalyst who was worked with Caribbean people and their descendants in the UK, is convinced that slavery in the Caribbean and American society caused 'trauma on a massive scale' that 'has been handed down through the generations, is still being handed down, and is hard to express and conceptualise' (p. 8). Amongst the legacies of slavery she includes fear. Fear is distinct from anxiety 'because it is likely to relate to a real rather than a phantasised past' [p. 9].

[4] Smith p. 9.

[5] Ward (1970 [1855]) xiv.

[6] Grottanelli (1999) 147; see also Bowersock (1994) 79-87.

[7] On masculine and feminine roles and conceptual categories in Artemidorus see especially MacAlister (1992).

[8] Pack (1955) 287-9 showed considerable insight in commenting, however briefly, on the ethical 'neutrality' of Artemidorus, and his tacit assumption that prostitutes, fugitives and thieves have as good a right as anyone to learn what the future may hold for them.

[9] Winkler in *Constraints of Desire*...

[10] On the utility of Artemidorus for the social historian of slavery, see especially Kudlien (1991) 68-81 and Bradley (1994****). An important article by del Corno published in a prominent reference work in 1978 certainly helped to draw attention to ancient dream interpretation, even if his description of Artemidorus' work as offering 'a mirror of reality' needs considerable modification in the light of the methodological problems I am trying to explore here.

[11] See specially Kudlien (1991) 72-7, 151.

[12] Bradley (1994) 142-4.

[13] Husser (1996) 23; Harris (2009) 50-1.

[14] Husser (1996) 82; Bouquet (2001).

[15] The exception is the charioteer's dream in the Euripidean *Rhesus*, on which see Kessels (1973) 32-3. In Homer the dream is experienced by King Rhesus (*Iliad* 10.494-7).

[16] See Husser (1996) 38. The *Legend of Sharrumkin* is published with commentary in Cooper and Heimpel (1983).

[17] Harris (2009) 93.

[18] paranormal

[19] See further Hall (2006) ***

[20] See LSJ under **eidō* B1.

[21] Winkler (***); see also MacAlister (1992)

[22] Aesop sex with owner's wife

[23] See the translation of Joseph Marique in Glimm, Marique and Walsh (1947) 233-4. See further Miller (1994) 131-47, Harris (2009) 69, and the acid comments of Brown (1988) 70 on Rhode's casual insensitivity towards her slave's sexual feelings.

[24] Harris (2009) 114.

[25] Miller (1994) 91.

[26] Bowersock (1994) 81; Walde (1999) 124

[27] The excellent study of Price (1986) illuminates the depth and nature of the impact of Freud on classical scholars' discussion of dreams during the 20th century.

[28] Ferguson (1996) 3.

[29] See e.g. the rather reductive interpretations in Kurth (1950).

[30] Above all Büchsenschütz (1868). Artemidorus was very familiar in German-speaking intellectual circles, having been printed in a German edition by Philipp Melanchthon, no less, as early as 1597. See Walde (1999) 126-7.

[31] Kessels (1973) 121-78.

[32] Hamilton (1996); Budd (1999).

[33] Budd (1999) ***

[34] Strassberg (2008) 12.

[35] Strassberg (2008) 84: 'Emperors and kings have dreams proper to them, sages and worthies have dreams proper to them, and workers and servants have dreams proper to them. Whether these indicate failure or success, poverty or abundance, every dream derives from the nature of the particular person'.

[36] Strassberg (2008) 87 n.14.

[37] Strassberg (2008) 247-8 n.15.

[38] A promising experiment in bringing transhistorical and transcultural discussions of dreams together is constituted by the collection edited by Shulman and Stroumsa (1999).

[39] Compare the 18th and 19th-century suspicion of dream-books as the province of irrational and under-educated women and plebeians, documented in Perkins (1999).

[40] Harris (2009) 150.

[41] Harris (2009) 25.

[42] Traill (2004); Harris (2009) 166.

[43] Harris (2009) 178-9.

[44] See Cancik (1999) 169.

[45] 9G 6-7 ed Perry pp. 36-7.

[46] See Gardner (2005).

[47] Miller (1994) 77.

[48] See MacAlister (1992) 147.

[49] Walde (1999) 131.

[50] Hall (2007).

[51] Woolman (1971) 161.

[52] First published in Longfellow (1842).

[53] Pease (1893) 34.

[54] With the apparent nostalgia for the slave's native land expressed in this dream interpretation cf. the graffito inscription found in an excavated house on Delos, first published by Couve (1895) 474, in which a slave recalls the figs and water of his homeland, Antioch on the Maeander.

[55] It is taken as a conceptual starting-point by Glancy (2003) 9-10 in the fine first chapter 'Bodies and Souls' of her study of slavery in early Christianity.